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Law often blocks sensitive personal information to prevent discrimina-
tion. It does so, however, without a theory or framework to determine
when doing so is warranted. As a result, these measures produce mixed
results. This article offers a framework for determining, with a view of
preventing discrimination, when personal information should flow and
when it should not. It examines the relationship between precluded per-
sonal information, such as race, and the proxies for precluded information,
such as names and zip codes. It proposes that the success of these measures
depends on what types of proxies exist for the information blocked and it
explores in which situations those proxies should also be blocked. This
framework predicts the effectiveness of antidiscriminatory privacy rules
and offers the potential of a wider protection to minorities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN a job interview, there are several things that potential employersare prohibited from asking job applicants. Think of rules precludingemployers from asking about an applicant’s age, disabilities, marital
status, or intention to have a child. The logic behind these rules is that
decision-makers will be unable to discriminate if they lack the sensitive
information needed to do so. These rules operate in several areas of the
law, such as those that govern landlord-tenant relationships, healthcare,
school admissions, loans, and, perhaps most prominently, employment. If
properly understood, they could operate in many more.
This dynamic shows an often overlooked approach to discrimination.
The traditional approach to discrimination acts after a discriminatory act
produces harm. It is reactive in the sense that it responds to how a deci-
sion-maker used information about a protected class. But sometimes the
law takes a proactive approach to discrimination. It prevents the decision-
maker from acquiring the information about an individual’s protected
class in the first place, which prevents her from taking an action that an-
tidiscrimination law would deem unlawful.
Discrimination is better avoided than compensated. Legal scholars
widely recognize that, while litigation is key to providing redress to those
who have been discriminated against and to discourage discrimination ex
ante, preventive measures can address the aim of eradicating discrimina-
tion more directly.1 Antidiscrimination law regulates behavior by curbing
1. MARIE MERCAT-BRUNS, DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: COMPARING EUROPEAN,
FRENCH, AND AMERICAN LAW 108 (Elaine Holt trans., 2016) (stating that “[a]lthough liti-
gation is important for bringing to light purportedly objective requirements perpetuating
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how people use information about others to establish discriminatory prac-
tices. Regulating the acquisition of such information next to these tradi-
tional, reactive efforts can yield enormous potential benefits.2
The law does this, however, without a coherent theory or framework to
determine when this approach is warranted—and why. Shooting in the
dark in such a way has led to mixed results, sometimes solving discrimina-
tion in a particular scenario and sometimes backfiring in unforeseen
ways, even escalating to scandals like the one surrounding “Ban the
Box.”3 In this paper, I address the method of regulating personal infor-
mation to prevent discrimination. To do so, I explore the information dy-
namics of discrimination to identify the conditions for designing effective
antidiscriminatory information rules, or antidiscriminatory privacy rules.
I offer a framework to determine when information should flow, and
when it should not flow, to effectively reduce discrimination against
minorities.
To identify such conditions, I analyze two canonical case studies often
used to illustrate the tension between information blocking (privacy) and
discrimination. The first is a well-known study conducted on auditions by
female musicians to examine a method for reducing gender discrimina-
tion in orchestra hires. Here, blocking information through privacy rules
protected against discrimination. The second is the attempt to protect
convicts by banning a “box” in job application forms that asks whether
the candidate has a criminal record. Here, privacy rules gave rise to fur-
ther discrimination.
Until now, we do not know why one of the policies worked so well and
the other worked so poorly. In other words, we have no theory to explain
workforce segregation, prevention is key to eliminating systemic discrimination” and argu-
ing that there is an interest in institutional changes that focus “on mechanisms of inclusion
over causes of exclusion: exploring other measures inciting people to take preventive ac-
tion against the causes of discrimination or to establish institution-wide safeguards”).
2. For example, this approach has been explicitly taken by the Canadian provinces of
Quebec and Manitoba. See Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the
Private Sector, C.Q.L.R., c P-39.1, s. 20 (Can. Que.) (“In the carrying on of an enterprise,
authorized employees, mandataries or agents or any party to a contract for work or ser-
vices may have access to personal information without the consent of the person concerned
only if the information is needed for the performance of their duties or the carrying out of
their mandates or contracts.”); Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M., c. P33.5, s.
13(1) (Can. Man.) (“A trustee shall not collect personal health information about an indi-
vidual unless (a) the information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a func-
tion or activity of the trustee; and (b) the collection of the information is necessary for that
purpose.”); see also Patrik Florencio & Erik Ramanathan, Secret Code: The Need for En-
hanced Privacy Protections in the United States and Canada to Prevent Employment Dis-
crimination Based on Genetic and Health Information, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 77, 111–12
(2001) (stating that “[a]t least two Canadian provinces, Quebec and Manitoba, have never-
theless enacted legislation that is designed to govern the collection of personal information
in the private sector, and similar legislation has been proposed in other provinces,” criticiz-
ing the Manitoba statute because it only applies to health institutions thereby excluding
collection of health information by employers and insurers, and criticizing ambiguities in
the Quebec statute that favor employers and insurers).
3. See infra Section II.A.
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when more information will help antidiscrimination efforts and when it
will harm them.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II discusses two case studies to
frame the analysis of the debate and examines the commonalities be-
tween the cases to determine when privacy rules could prevent discrimi-
nation. Part III focuses on the paper’s theoretical implications. It suggests
that the privacy versus antidiscrimination debate is premised on the false
dichotomy that information either always or never helps fight discrimina-
tion. It then addresses the economic literature on information and dis-
crimination to introduce three scenarios in which a privacy-based
antidiscrimination approach will be more effective than its ex ante alter-
natives: skewed samples, processing errors, and intentional
discrimination.
Part IV suggests that discrimination can also be viewed as an informa-
tion problem. It shows how proxies determine when an antidis-
criminatory privacy rule will be effective. It then evaluates the scope of
this method by presenting a typology with three types of proxies (transfer
proxies, reducing proxies, and expanding proxies) and discusses which
proxies should be blocked.
Part V applies this analysis to the Equal Protection Doctrine. It shows
that information rules can be used to provide protections similar to dispa-
rate impact when there is no applicable statute that recognizes disparate
impact. It addresses how information rules can be used to address facially
neutral discriminatory decisions and introduces their limitations to ad-
dress substantive inequality, particularly regarding affirmative action.
Part VI reconsiders the predominant classification between prejudice-
based and statistical discrimination in light of these policy considerations
and proposes rather to distinguish between bias-driven and “rational”
discrimination for information purposes. It then evaluates the general ad-
vantages of building a precautionary approach to antidiscrimination:
harm is better avoided than compensated.
II. CASE STUDIES
A. TWO FIELD EXPERIMENTS ON INFORMATION BLOCKING
The two case studies analyzed are the cases of orchestra auditions and
“Ban the Box.” The first is a field experiment conducted on symphony
orchestra auditions to examine a method of reducing gender discrimina-
tion.4 The second is an experiment that studies the attempt to help people
who have been in prison reintegrate into society by banning the “box” in
employer forms that asks whether the candidate has a criminal record.5
As I will show, these cases illustrate when rules that regulate the flow of
4. This study has been used to show privacy’s alleged compatibility with antidis-
crimination. See infra Part III.
5. This study has been used to show privacy’s alleged tension with antidiscrimination.
See infra Part III.
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personal information (privacy rules)6 are compatible with antidiscrimina-
tion efforts and when they are not.
In 2000, a group of economists conducted a field experiment that pro-
vided a novel way to test for gender-biased hiring in symphony orchestra
auditions.7 Most of the prior economic literature on discrimination had
focused on disparities in earnings,8 but few were able to address actual
hiring practices.9 Even though orchestra directors are the kind of well-
trained professionals that one expects not to have gender biases, and
even though symphony orchestras had a fairly transparent hiring proce-
dure, a gap prevailed between the proportion of female elite music school
graduates and female elite orchestra hires.10
After auditions were held behind a physical screen (often a curtain),
preventing those hosting auditions from knowing the auditionee’s gender,
female hires increased by one third.11 The screens increased the ex-ante
probability of each woman to pass the initial round by 50%.12 The study
generated a research context where discrimination in the workplace
seemed pervasive.
Another field experiment that speaks to this issue, although concluding
in an opposite direction, studies the Ban the Box policy. The Ban the Box
policy prohibits employers from asking applicants before interviews
whether they have a criminal record—a question often found in applica-
tion forms accompanied by yes-or-no checkboxes. This policy is an at-
tempt to protect people who have been in prison and help them
reintegrate into society, given that having a criminal record is a substan-
tial barrier for obtaining employment.13 In many states, the initiative also
explicitly aimed to protect black men to the extent that they are dispro-
portionately likely to have criminal records, so they should disproportion-
ately benefit when criminal records are not considered in employment
applications; the policy would thereby level employment possibilities for
people who hold those records.14
By sending fictitious job applications to entry-level positions in states
that implemented the policy, Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr showed that
6. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: POLICY, TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 231 (2009) (defining privacy in terms of information
flows).
7. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 715 (2000).
8. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 9–10, 14 (1957).
9. Goldin & Rouse, supra note 7, at 715.
10. See id. at 715–16.
11. Id. at 716 (stating that “the screen increases the probability a woman will be ad-
vanced out of a preliminary round when there is no semifinal round”).
12. Id. at 738.
13. See Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. L. &
ECON. 451, 452–53 (2006); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC.
937, 938–39 (2003).
14. Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Dis-
crimination: A Field Experiment, 113 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 191, 193–95 (2018).
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Ban the Box backfired by fostering discrimination based on race.15 This
adverse effect had been anticipated before,16 and it had been argued that
“empirical estimates indicate that employers who perform criminal back-
ground checks are more likely to hire black applicants than employers
that do not.”17 However, until 2016, that effect remained to be proved
experimentally.
Agan and Starr showed that, in the absence of the policy, white appli-
cants received 7% more callbacks than similarly qualified black appli-
cants; however, after the policy went into effect, the gap increased to
45%.18 This more than six-fold increase in the gap indicates that the pol-
icy was detrimental for black applicants without a criminal record and
beneficial for white applicants with one.19 “[W]hen employers lack indi-
vidualized information about criminal history, they tend to statistically
generalize that black applicants are likely to have records and white ap-
plicants are likely not to have them,”20 although the impact of the policy
in hiring practices exaggerates actual racial differences in criminal
records.21
B. SCOPE OF AN INFORMATION APPROACH
These case studies are useful for exploring how privacy rules can over-
come their limitations for antidiscrimination aims. As I mentioned above,
statutes and regulations often block information flows to prevent discrim-
15. Id.
16. See Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, supra note 13, at 452 (“If accessibility to criminal
history information is limited (because of cost or legal prohibitions), employers may infer
the likelihood of past criminal activity from such traits as gender, race, or age.”); see also
Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal His-
tory Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 278, 284–85 (2004) (using data from the
1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to argue that, in states without
availability of criminal records, African Americans have slightly lower wages due to statis-
tical discrimination); Keith Finlay, Effect of Employer Access to Criminal History Data on
the Labor Market Outcomes of Ex-Offenders and Non-Offenders, in STUDIES OF LABOR
MARKET INTERMEDIATION 89–90 (David H. Autor ed., 2009) (using the same database to
argue that the availability of criminal records worsen ex-offenders position in the labor
market but do not improve the position of non-offenders from highly offending groups);
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 367–71
(2008) (explaining the differences between both studies).
17. Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, supra note 13, at 474.
18. Agan & Starr, supra note 14, at 195; see also Mike Vuolo, Sarah Langeson &
Christopher Uggen, Criminal Record Questions in the Era of “Ban the Box”, 16 CRIMINOL-
OGY & PUB. POL’Y 139, 159 (2017) (finding that race gaps in callbacks is lower when job
applicants can signal not having a criminal record); Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary &
Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 48–50 (2018) (finding that record clearing positively affects
short-term employment rate and earning capacity); Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Han-
sen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories are Hidden (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016).
19. See Agan & Starr, supra note 14, at 195.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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inatory outcomes but, so far, a framework is lacking—and is needed—to
determine when this approach is warranted.
To determine the scope of application of privacy rules with antidis-
criminatory purposes, the first question to ask regarding the two case
studies is what they have in common. Both of them involved a decision-
maker with a certain degree of discretion, a one-time decision (being
hired from the audition, or being called for an in-person interview from
the resume), and a minority status that the law did not want considered.
The approach explored here, accordingly, can be used in any instance in
which there is a decision-maker who has a certain degree of discretion,
and the law wants to prevent the use of one of the data points available to
make a decision—such as minority status.
Given the clarity of these employment examples, I use them to center
the analysis on the dynamic between discrimination and disclosure of in-
formation. Employment discrimination is particularly relevant because
employment is a clear way to distribute wealth and opportunities in our
society. It also encompasses a normatively distinct set of decisions since it
is covered by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,22 which prohibits
employment discrimination and includes the Disparate Impact Doc-
trine.23 However, employment is not the only socially relevant and insti-
tutionalized context in which discrimination takes place, and the
antidiscriminatory information approach studied here can be applied to a
wide range of discriminatory practices.
People’s lives can be significantly affected by discrimination in these
decisions, such as in the housing or insurance market.24 Other domains
where this framework applies, for example, are healthcare, law enforce-
ment, or university admissions, among many others.25 Casual instances of
discrimination that are individually difficult to detect and address, but can
be measured in aggregation, can be as ubiquitous as they can be im-
22. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)).
23. In this sense, employment discrimination in the U.S. is more similar to that of
other jurisdictions than is antidiscrimination law in other areas. See Brit. Columbia (Pub.
Serv. Emp. Relations Comm’n) v. B.C. Gov’t Serv. Emps.’ Union, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 3–5
(Can.) [hereinafter Meiorin] (establishing a test to determine the extent of bona fide occu-
pational requirement justification, equivalent to the U.S. business necessity concept).
24. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Per-
sonal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1167–78 n.31 (2008) (explaining that the New
York housing market had traditionally discriminated against musicians, because they are
loud, and lawyers, because they know their rights too well); see also Donald McNeil Jr., He
Took a Drug to Prevent AIDS. Then He Couldn’t Get Disability Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/health/truvada-hiv-insurance.html
[https://perma.cc/GKT7-H4XC] (telling the story of a urology resident who was denied
disability insurance for taking a pre-exposure prophylaxis drug for HIV).
25. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance,
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (2005); R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism
Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2004); The Model Minority Is Losing Patience,
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/10/03/the-model-
minority-is-losing-patience [https://perma.cc/AFC8-5Q48].
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pactful.26 For example, research indicates that doctors are more likely to
prescribe painkillers to white patients than they are to black patients—
racial disparities in pain assessment lead to different treatment recom-
mendations.27 While it is difficult to regulate this behavior through an-
tidiscrimination law because it is a casual instance of discrimination that
is difficult to see at an individual level, one could devise different ways to
block information to prevent it, such as by hiding patients’ ethnicity in
initial stages.
C. PREVENTIVE INFORMATION RULES
As the case studies illustrate, blocking an information flow is successful
in combating discrimination in some cases, but not in all of them. One
could be tempted to see the interactions in these case studies as not in-
volving a privacy rule because they do not refer to the larger societal
values that privacy often serves, such as autonomy or personhood. The
reason why one can and should refer to it a privacy rule is that the infor-
mation dynamic is the same as that of privacy: a channel of personal in-
formation flow deemed undesirable is blocked.28 Although the social
goals here are different from in most cases in which privacy is established,
the interaction between two people is intervened in a similar vein.29 Both
the screen in the symphony orchestra study and the Ban the Box policy
produced a rule that blocked an information flow. By doing so, the rules
forced decision-makers to make their choice without using a data point
that the policy-maker did not want considered.30
Whether we choose to call this mechanism “privacy” is not central to
adopting the framework that I propose here. One could read this propo-
sal as one that studies “antidiscriminatory information rules” instead of
“antidiscriminatory privacy rules” while leaving the proposed framework
unchanged. But becoming conscious of this informational parallel allows
one to see a new dynamic between privacy and antidiscrimination. Pri-
vacy has long been known to safeguard societal interests broader than
26. See Colleen Sheppard, Institutional Inequality and the Dynamics of Courage, 31
WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 103 (2013) (discussing institutionalized ine-
quality and systemic discrimination).
27. See Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recom-
mendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4296, 4296 (2016).
28. See Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2097, 2146 (2014) (“Prohibiting requests for information related to race,
sex, ethnicity, national origin, religion, age, or disability could bypass discrimination in at
least some instances.”); see also Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of Ameri-
can Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2000).
29. Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 LAW & PHIL. 119, 144
(2003) (“instead of waiting for such discrimination to occur and then providing a remedy,
we may want to prevent the discrimination in the first place. Granting a privacy right over
one’s HIV status can in this way function as a kind of anticipatory remedy”).
30. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 4, 236–37 (2010); Helen
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 19 WASH. L. REV. 119, 143–49 (2004) (con-
ceptualizing privacy as information flows).
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privacy interests.31 For example, Robert Post has said that privacy at-
tempts to protect rules of civility and the identities of individuals in a
community,32 and I have argued elsewhere that privacy law also protects
reputational interests.33
Similarly, privacy rules can be used to further society’s antidiscrimina-
tion interests.34 When used for this purpose, privacy rules have a preven-
tive nature.35 This preventive nature of these rules allows us to avoid the
harms created by discriminatory conduct, rather than repairing them.36
III. PRIVACY VERSUS ANTIDISCRIMINATION
A. CURRENT VIEWS
The framework I propose challenges the universal applicability of two
opposing beliefs: that privacy and antidiscrimination are always in opposi-
tion to one another, sometimes found in economics, and the belief that
they are always complementary. I argue that neither scholarly perspective
presents a full account of the dynamic between privacy and discrimina-
tion: privacy can protect against discrimination as well as enable a dis-
criminatory dynamic. This Part identifies the conditions that give rise to
each of these effects.
Often in economics, discrimination is described as a problem of not
having enough information about others.37 According to this account,
having insufficient information leads people to resort to heuristics to
judge others, which can easily result in false opinions. These false opin-
ions, in turn, are attributed to everyone who falls under the heuristic,
resulting in beliefs that could be racist, sexist, or homophobic.38
Making information about oneself more available would therefore
avoid the need for such heuristics and reduce discrimination, while having
more privacy would worsen it.39 Representing the standard economic ac-
count, Lior Strahilevitz has argued that “by increasing the availability of
information about individuals, we can reduce decision-makers’ reliance
on information about groups”40 and that, therefore, “there is often an
31. Austin, supra note 29, at 144 (“By granting a privacy right over the information, we
protect an individual against wrongs that are not themselves best described as invasions of
privacy”).
32. Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Com-
mon Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1008 (1989).
33. Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
1039, 1058–61 (2018).
34. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051,
2052–54 (2018) (arguing that principles of constitutional equality should be used to rejuve-
nate privacy law, which may otherwise have disparate outcomes along the lines of privilege
in its application).
35. Austin, supra note 29, at 144 (“privacy functions more like an anticipatory remedy
than a description of the wrong”).
36. See infra Section VI.C.
37. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 364, 380.
38. See id.
39. See id.; see also Bushway, supra note 16, at 285.
40. Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 364.
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essential conflict between information privacy protections and antidis-
crimination principles, such that reducing privacy protections will reduce
the prevalence of distasteful statistical discrimination.”41
The underlying idea of this account is that, in many contexts, society
must tolerate statistical discrimination because the only way to dispense
with it is to provide decision-makers with more information, but there is a
normative reason for which they should not have access to it.42 Increasing
privacy, therefore, could only make matters worse.
This idea permeates interactions outside of the academic discourse as
well. For example, the LGBTQ movement implicitly used this rhetoric to
advocate coming out of the closet as a political strategy. The idea was that
increased visibility would lead the general population to see that they
interact with LGBTQ people every day and, consequently, lead to a de-
cline in prejudices.43 Their understanding views privacy and efforts to halt
discrimination as existing in tension.
Providing more information may be effective as an individual strategy
when information is not blocked for the decision-maker; individuals have
incentives to disclose information that would help them avoid discrimina-
tion. In states that did not subscribe to Ban the Box, for example, job
applicants with a criminal record could present further information such
as lack of recidivism or other post-conviction jobs in the hopes of a more
individualized consideration. In some jurisdictions, women who already
have children mention them in their resume to signal that they are less
likely to have more.44 However, while effective for some individuals,
these measures cannot eliminate statistical discrimination—they can only
make it narrower.45
Some legal scholars, however, have argued that, in specific institutional
contexts, limiting information can aid in antidiscriminatory efforts, partic-
ularly for landlord-tenant relationships,46 genetic information,47 and disa-
41. Id. at 364; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 24, at 1682–88.
42. See Strahilevitz, supra note 24, at 1669–70.
43. See, e.g., MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA AND
THE CLOSETS OF POWER 82–83 (1993); RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 224–25 (1988) (describing Harvey Milk’s famous
Hope Speech and reporting that Milk stated “I ask my gay sisters and brothers to make the
commitment to fight. For themselves, for their freedom, for their country . . . [W]e will not
win our rights by staying quietly in our closets . . . We are coming out to fight the lies, the
myths, the distortions. We are coming out to tell the truths about gays, for I am tired of the
conspiracy of silence, so I’m going to talk about it. And I want you to talk about it. You
must come out.”).
44. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 54–56, 83 (2016) (finding that
concealing family information lowers female applicants’ hiring prospects).
45. See infra Part VI.
46. See Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal
to Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1369–72 (2007).
47. See Florencio & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 111–12 (2001); Roberts, supra note
28, at 2127–40.
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bility law.48 In particular, Jessica Roberts has made the more general
claim that privacy and antidiscrimination are complementary.49
Taking the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) as a
case study, Roberts argues that discriminators need information to dis-
criminate, and the law can strip them from it.50 Unlike previous statutes,
GINA’s privacy provision is explicit in its antidiscriminatory efforts (even
including them under the employment discrimination title), but it illus-
trates a wider mechanism that Roberts calls the privacy/antidiscrimina-
tion symbiosis.51
The framework I propose here questions the universal applicability of
both beliefs: that privacy and antidiscrimination are opposing values and
that they are complementary ones. Privacy rules, I suggest here, have an
appropriate scope in aiding antidiscriminatory efforts. To identify such
scope, the next Section asks how and when privacy rules can be used as a
method to prevent discriminatory decisions. After that, the following Part
argues that the effectiveness of privacy rules crucially depends on the
type of proxies that they force decision-makers into using.52
B. IDENTIFYING WHEN INFORMATION FOSTERS DISCRIMINATION
The question that emanates from the case studies and the discussion
outlined above is under which circumstances the use of privacy rules is an
effective method to combat discrimination. After seeing that, in some
cases, privacy has aided in antidiscriminatory efforts and, in others, it
worsened discrimination, we will see how the existence and type of prox-
ies determine under which conditions blocking an information flow will
be successful in preventing discrimination. But before doing so, the next
question to address is whether and when the economic approach de-
scribed might be mistaken in believing that more information would solve
the discrimination problem. Thus, blocking information might be effec-
tive but unnecessary. This leads to a typology. Privacy rules reduce dis-
crimination in a way that more information does not under three
conditions.
First, blocking future information is useful when information samples
are expected to be skewed and only a non-infinite amount of information
can be gathered. For example, if the New York Police Department de-
cided to engage in predictive policing based only on prior arrest numbers,
and if it had more of its police force in the Bronx than in other boroughs,
then it would be likely to make more arrests there than anywhere else.
48. See Nicholas Caivano, Inaccessible Inclusion: Privacy, Disclosure and Accommo-
dation of Mental Illness in the Workplace, 5 CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 97, 117–27 (2016); Roberts,
supra note 28, at 2157–58 (focusing on disability law but also extrapolating those conclu-
sions to make a general argument).
49. Id. at 2113 (clarifying that this is despite the different normative values held by
privacy law and antidiscrimination law).
50. Id. at 2126–27.
51. Id. at 2127–40.
52. See infra Part IV.
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This would lead to more comparative police presence in the Bronx, lead-
ing to more comparative arrests, and so on and so forth, independent of
the actual crime rates. More information would be unhelpful for the New
York Police Department in that case, and they would be better off if that
information flow were blocked.
Second, blocking certain data points can be useful when people do not
update prior beliefs as cleanly as neoclassical economic models would
suggest—perhaps due to representativeness heuristics and confirmation
biases.53 People have limited time and attention to receive information,
even when the information is unlimited.54 Moreover, once people form a
belief, most do not update their prior beliefs as cleanly as an ideal ra-
tional actor would when new information arrives.55 The importance of
this effect will be different depending on context and on the informa-
tional demands of the decision. Simple decisions that require little infor-
mation are likely to be better updated with new information than
complex decisions either rooted in deep beliefs or subject to an informa-
tion overload because they are informed by an already prodigious
amount of information.56
Moreover, people often make assumptions and generalizations subcon-
sciously, and these assumptions and generalizations about groups perme-
ate their decisions about individuals both consciously and
subconsciously.57 In the orchestra auditions example, orchestra directors
were probably not discriminating against women willingly, but their gen-
der biases led them to underestimate women’s performance. This effect is
most relevant when people make decisions based on facts that are neither
entirely correct nor mistaken, but rather hold an exaggerated “kernel of
truth.”58 For example, employers in the Ban the Box case were correct
about the general effect of race as a predictor of having a criminal record,
but on average they exaggerated its magnitude; the actual correlation was
neither nonexistent nor as high as employers estimated—employers over-
reacted to an existing gap.59
53. See David Grether, Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness
Heuristic, 95 Q. J. ECON. 537, 537–38 (1980) (describing representativeness heuristic); Ray-
mond Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
G. PSYCHOL. 175, 198 (1998) (describing confirmation bias).
54. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 9–10 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063,
2063–64 (2001).
55. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,
87 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876–93 (2004); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and
Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 36–53
(2007).
56. See Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behav-
ioral World, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1471, 1489–90 (2018).
57. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 55, at 876 (“Merely thinking about Blacks can lead
people to evaluate ambiguous behavior as aggressive, to miscategorize harmless objects as
weapons, or to shoot quickly, and, at times, inappropriately.”); Nosek et al., supra note 55,
at 7.
58. Pedro Bordalo et al., Stereotypes, 131 Q. J. ECON. 1753, 1791 (2016).
59. Agan & Starr, supra note 14, at 195.
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A third scenario in which blocking information points can be a useful
preventive mechanism is when there are no problems in collecting or
processing information but, due to larger societal values, the law does not
want an information point considered. This is the case of intentional sta-
tistical discrimination, where a decision-maker purposely employs a heu-
ristic for information cost saving, but that heuristic discriminates against a
protected class.60
These scenarios help determine when a privacy-based antidiscrimina-
tion rule is warranted. For all three scenarios, the key element in estab-
lishing an effective privacy-based antidiscriminatory rule is noting that,
when a data point is blocked with the intention of preventing a discrimi-
natory decision, often there are proxies available for such blocked infor-
mation, and the rule should address those proxies accordingly.61
IV. DISCRIMINATION AS AN INFORMATION PROBLEM
A. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PROXIES
Proxies are a tool that the law has been using and fearing for decades
and a framework to evaluate them properly can be useful to update the
conversation about them. The considerations above allow one to examine
the set of conditions under which privacy rules will worsen discrimination
and the ones under which they will prevent it. Why did a privacy rule
work to stop discrimination against female musicians but backfired in the
Ban the Box case?
For an answer, we can build on an insight from the literature on al-
gorithmic discrimination. In evaluating how algorithms discriminate, So-
lon Barocas and Andrew Selbst show that algorithms can pick up data
points that act as proxies for proscribed categories, thereby leading to
discriminatory results.62 This conclusion can be extended to human be-
ings, who can also identify, consciously or unconsciously, proxies for in-
formation points that are proscribed by the law. Identifying when
decision-makers are able to do this is crucial when evaluating privacy-
based antidiscriminatory rules.
60. See infra Section VI.A (developing this idea). Viewing Phelps’s statistical discrimi-
nation model, explained below, in light of this statement, the law might want to prevent
people with purple hair from being discriminated against.
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 675 (2016) (“Even in situations where data miners are extremely careful, they
can still effect discriminatory results with models that, quite unintentionally, pick out proxy
variables for protected classes.”); id. at 691–92 (“Cases of decision making that do not
artificially introduce discriminatory effects into the data mining process may nevertheless
result in systematically less favorable determinations for members of protected classes.
This is possible when the criteria that are genuinely relevant in making rational and well-
informed decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies for class membership.”); see
also James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF.
REV. ONLINE 164, 171–72 (2017); Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2018) (explaining how algorithmic decision-making works
with proxies in a dynamic setting).
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In terms of information dynamics, the difference between one case and
the other is the existence of proxies that allowed the decision-makers to
gauge the data that the rule attempted to block. Orchestra directors could
not know through any other information point whether, for example, a
violin player was male or female (they might have guessed had it been an
opera audition). Employers in states that implemented the Ban the Box
policy, on the other hand, knew or believed that black males had a higher
probability of having a criminal record than other applicants.
In the Ban the Box case, privacy rules were less effective not only be-
cause they failed to protect most of the group that they intended to pro-
tect, but also because they shifted the existing discrimination from a
disfavored group to proxies that affected another group disproportion-
ately. This was especially damaging because the second group (black
males) was socially disadvantaged and historically considered worthy of
protection as well.63
Shifting discrimination in such a way is only possible when proxies for
the blocked piece of information are available. Where the proxies are
believed to be accurate and are easily observable, the risk of shifting dis-
crimination only increases. The decision-maker can use those proxies
with equally negative or even more devastating results than would have
resulted from using the blocked information in the original discriminatory
decision. Therefore, it is crucial for any effective antidiscrimination-moti-
vated privacy rule to identify and block those information flows as well.
Checking for the existence of these proxies is necessary to predict the
effectiveness of any antidiscriminatory privacy rules and is of crucial im-
portance to design better ones.
This analysis would have helped predict that the Ban the Box policy
would not achieve its objectives. Moreover, it could have predicted that it
would backfire. This prediction, in turn, would have saved not only the
policy’s administration costs but also the social costs of the discrimination
it unintendedly generated.
It also illustrates that blocking those proxies as well could have re-
versed the regulation’s unintended effect. For example, the regulation
could have mandated the use of initials (and not full names) in resumes,
making it more difficult to identify race before the interview.64 This
would have effectively impeded gender- and race-based discrimination
until the interview stage by eliminating available proxies, thereby achiev-
ing the policy’s aim.
63. See Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 1669–70, 1685–86 (arguing that the case shows
that some types of statistical discrimination must be tolerated).
64. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Em-
ployable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–92 (2004) (showing that names work as accurate predictors of
race, and that people with black-sounding names receive fewer callbacks than people with
white-sounding names).
2019] Antidiscriminatory Privacy 153
B. CHOOSING WHICH PROXIES TO BLOCK
A crucial task, then, is to identify which pieces of information are prox-
ies for others. A first approximation could lead one to believe that one
should measure these objectively, and to consider that proxies are about
correlation between two data points. Under this conception, if Abby does
not know X about Ben, but she knows Y, and Y happens to correlate with
X, then she could see Y as a proxy for X. However, it is not the objective
relationship between X and Y, but their relationship in Abby’s subjective
perception what will determine the extent to which she is likely to use X
instead of Y to judge Ben. Abby’s subjective perception might or might
not trace an objective relationship. This idea is further developed in the
Appendix.
One policy outcome that could stem from these considerations is the
following: the law should block information to prevent discrimination
when there are no available proxies for those information points, or when
it can acceptably block those proxies as well.65 The problem with such a
statement is that, because there will always be some subjective relation-
ship between different information points, one might have to block infor-
mation ad infinitum. One would never cease to find more information
points that, to some degree, people perceive to be predictive of each
other and would need to be blocked. This would become unfeasible not
only because it would be administratively difficult, but also because some
of those information points that are perceived to predict protected class
will also be genuinely useful to measure job performance—so blocking
them might ultimately be undesirable. For example, education can predict
race in some institutional settings, but it is also relevant for job
performance.
One approach to such a problem would be to implement a discretion-
ary cutoff rule. Such a rule would block information points only above a
certain level of perceived predictiveness.66
This approach could be complemented with a balancing test between
the information point’s perceived predictiveness of the protected cate-
gory and its predictiveness of successful job performance. This is analo-
gous to the business necessity rule, which provides for an employer’s duty
of accommodation to be sidestepped if it creates undue hardship.67 Dis-
criminating against a deaf individual, for example, is proscribed, but it
would be reasonable to allow a call center not to take such applications.
65. This relates to the wider argument that both disability law and antidiscrimination
law place burdens on decision-makers. Because blocking any proxy might be inconvenient
for decision-makers, doing so poses burdens for them. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimina-
tion and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 684–86 (2001) (showing that antidis-
crimination law, like disability law, contains duties of accommodation).
66. In the terms set in the Appendix, this would mean setting the cutoff point at some
level of cross elasticity. The cutoff point could be E=0.5, since this is the point in which the
information points are closer to being substitutes than to being independent, but higher
cutoff points should be considered depending on the number of proxies identified.
67. An even closer analogy exists in Canadian law under the second stage of the analy-
sis established in Meiorin. See supra note 23, at 5.
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Oftentimes it is difficult to determine what successful job performance
entails, but this is a general limitation and such obstacle is not new to
employment discrimination law.
There are cases in which one should not give any weight to whether the
information that serves as a proxy is also useful to determine job per-
formance.68 There are often situations in which policymakers can reason-
ably believe that there is intentional discrimination that falls under
disparate treatment but, because discriminatory intent is difficult to
prove, disparate impact is used as an evidentiary approach.69 In those
cases, one might simply want to block the proxy regardless of its useful-
ness to measure job performance. For example, imagine a group of deci-
sion-makers that cannot perceive race given an antidiscriminatory privacy
rule, but they are considering race when making decisions, either con-
sciously or unconsciously, so they use any proxy that they have available.
In that case, if as a matter of policy the legislature does not want them to
consider race at all, it will also want to prevent them from gauging race
through any proxies at all.70
Nonetheless, legislatures might want to balance these concerns with
perceived predictiveness to avoid unduly burdening decision-makers
when lawmakers believe that there is no intentional discrimination (no
disparate treatment) but, rather, discrimination with an actual disparate
impact.
A different approach, rather than simply blocking all proxies or relying
on balancing, stems from analyzing the effects that different proxies have
on decisions.
C. A TYPOLOGY: TRANSFER, REDUCING, AND EXPANDING PROXIES
Given what has been discussed so far, I propose to classify the proxies
that decision-makers can be forced into when an information point is
68. See infra Part VI (describing statistical discrimination).
69. See infra Section V.A (describing disparate treatment and disparate impact); see
also Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 318, 357–58 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court established disparate impact
theory partly due to the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent); George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV.
1297, 1331 (1987). Contra Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 740–41, 768–73 (2006) (arguing that courts do not use disparate impact
theory in a manner to sidestep the intentional requirement of disparate treatment); but see
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
there was disparate treatment and no disparate impact); Joseph Seiner, Disentangling Dis-
parate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 95, 107–09 (2006) (presenting the argument that disparate impact has become
an antiquated doctrine).
70. Another scenario in which balancing would be undesirable is proxies that can pre-
dict job performance but are redundant to measure it because there are other information
points that can predict it as well—and which are not a proxy for protected class. If there
are information points that are redundantly informative of job performance, legislatures
could mandate that decision-makers use those that do not function as a proxy for protected
categories.
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blocked into three categories: transfer proxies, reducing proxies, and ex-
panding proxies.
I will call transfer proxies those that shift discrimination from one
group to another, non-identical, group. This was the case, for example,
under Ban the Box, under which discrimination shifted from people with
a criminal record to black men. The groups “people with a criminal re-
cord” and “black men” overlapped, but not completely.
Transfer proxies make one group better-off and another group worse-
off. Individuals in the information point group that do not overlap with
the proxy group see their situation improved, while members of the proxy
group that do not overlap with the information group see it worsened. In
other words, transfer proxies benefit one group to the detriment of an-
other group that has some overlap with the first. In the Ban the Box case,
the shift made “people with a criminal record that are not black men”
better-off and “black men without a criminal record” worse-off. The
members of group with an overlap (black men with a criminal record)
would not have their situation substantively modified.
I. Point
Proxy
Figure 1: Illustrates Transfer Proxies
Reducing proxies are those in which the proxy group is a subset of the
information group. Instead of shifting discrimination like transfer proxies
do, reducing proxies benefit the members of the information group that
are not also members of the proxy group.
Imagine, for example, an industry that has shown an aversion towards
hiring Latinos, where being Latino is unobservable at a callback stage but
can be ascertained through proxies such as having a Spanish first name or
last name. A system with initials for first names in resumes would force
decision-makers into only using the last name as a predictor of being La-
tino. In such a way, it would prevent discrimination at a call back stage
for individuals with a Spanish first name but without a Spanish last name.
It would improve the situation of those in the “Spanish first name or
Spanish last name” information group that are not also members of the
new “Spanish last name” proxy group. In other words, it would not solve
the problem, but at least some individuals would be protected, creating
an improvement over the prior situation.
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I. Point
Proxy
Figure 2: Illustrates Reducing Proxies
Expanding proxies are the opposite of reducing proxies. With ex-
panding proxies, the information group is a subset of the proxy group.
Instead of focusing discrimination in a subgroup of the group that was
initially discriminated against, expanding proxies diffuse instances of dis-
crimination among the members of a larger group.
The difference in the mechanics between expanding and reducing prox-
ies is that, when a proxy expands an information group, this move is not
categorical but probabilistic.
Imagine an employer that wants to avoid hiring someone who might
soon take maternity leave. Most jurisdictions prohibit asking this ques-
tion directly.71 Many have rightfully argued that, in that case, the em-
ployer might disadvantage all women instead—or, more likely, young
women who do not already have children.72 However, the employer will
not disadvantage this larger group of candidates as much as it would have
disadvantaged candidates whom it knows will take a maternity leave if it
could ask them so, because any of these candidates have only a
probability of doing so.73
Because the process is probabilistic, the groups’ relative sizes matter. It
might not be feasible for an employer to avoid hiring all women, so the
71. King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258–59 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
that unlawful bias may be found where a job interview included questions about preg-
nancy, childbearing, and childcare, which were not regularly asked of either male of female
applicants); Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F.2d 139, 141–43 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
questioning a female applicant about whether she “would get pregnant and quit” is dis-
criminatory under Title VII); Bruno v. City of Crown Point, Ind., 950 F.2d 355, 358, 362
(7th Cir. 1991) (holding that questioning a female applicant about whether “it was time to
have more children” is discriminatory under Title VII); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES AND MARITAL STATUS OR NUMBER OF CHILDREN,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_marital_status.cfm [https://perma.cc/MKV2-
DL2F] (advising employers against asking the applicant about her future child bearing
plans). For protections against this question at the state level, see, e.g., 804 MASS. CODE
REGS. 3.02 (2015) (prohibiting “[i]nquiries into whether applicant has children, plans to
have children, or has child care arrangements”).
Similar protections exist in Canada. See, e.g., Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
C.Q.L.R., c C-12, s. 18.1 (Can. Que.); Vaid v. Freeman Formal Wear, 2009 HRTO 2273, ¶
24–31 (Can. Ont.) (holding that a question relating to a female applicant’s “plans to have a
family” contravenes the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 5(1)).
72. One strategic way for women who already have children to partially counteract
this effect would be to add this information in their resume to signal that, since they al-
ready have children, they are less likely to have more. See, e.g., Hersch, supra note 44, at
56, 83 (finding that concealing family information lowers female applicants’ hiring
prospects).
73. See infra Section VI.A (describing statistical discrimination).
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move from the information point to the proxy will not lead to female
applicants being categorically excluded. However, it might be feasible for
an employer to avoid hiring people from a minority religion. For exam-
ple, imagine an employer wanted to avoid hiring women who wear a veil
and a policymaker wanted to protect these candidates from such a deci-
sion. The policymaker should evaluate how many Muslim women choose
to wear a veil: if the majority do, then blocking the information might
lead employers to shift to discriminate all Muslim women, against the
policy’s aim. The question of whether to make the probabilistic shift from
women who want children to all women may seem like the question of
whether to make the shift from Muslim women who wear a veil to all




Figure 3: Illustrates Expanding Proxies
When an information point is blocked for antidiscriminatory aims, and
there are proxies available for such information point, blocking these
proxies will be most effective. However, blocking those proxies is often
not possible or, while possible, is unfeasible—for example, because they
are also legitimate predictors of job performance. But that should not be
the end of the story. In those cases, the law should evaluate what is the
information dynamic that the proxies introduce.
Shifting discrimination from one group to another (transfer proxies)
will generally be considered undesirable. However, privacy-based antidis-
crimination rules can sometimes force decision-makers into using proxies
that are narrower than the information they were previously relying on
(reducing proxies), preventing at least a section of that group from being
targeted. These rules can also force decision-makers into using proxies
that are diffused enough so that they cannot target any group directly, but
must address all members of a larger group probabilistically (expanding
proxies).
Whether it is desirable to force a decision-maker into reducing proxies
or expanding proxies will depend on the relationship of the proxy with
groups that have been historically protected by legislatures or are consid-
ered particularly vulnerable. It will also depend on how much one be-
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lieves that traditional antidiscrimination law will be effective at
addressing the remaining discrimination.
One example of this mechanism is the effort of the several jurisdictions
that have historically engaged, even absent this framework, in the third
type of proxy to diffuse discrimination against women who might want to
have children and are applying for jobs.74
Another example are the recent laws in Massachusetts, New York, and
Philadelphia that prohibit employers from asking job applicants about
previous salaries (and, for Massachusetts, requiring employers to state
compensation figures upfront) in order to prevent gender discrimina-
tion.75 With this prohibition, employers may assume that all female (or
minority female) applicants had lower salaries than their male counter-
parts did, especially by using information from gender pay gap statistics
in the applicants’ industry or territory. This would force employers into
an expanding proxy that diffuses the targeted discrimination. In line with
this prediction, evidence from field experiments suggests that employers
who cannot observe wage history consider a wider variety of
candidates.76
V. EXPANDING EQUAL PROTECTION
A. ANTICLASSIFICATION AND ANTISUBORDINATION
In the constitutional context, courts and scholars have struggled to de-
fine the appropriate scope of antidiscrimination in a way that mirrors the
tension between statutes that include disparate impact and statutes that
limit discrimination to disparate treatment.77 The information approach
analyzed here avoids some of these hurdles that antidiscrimination law
faces.
The struggle over the understanding of equal protection since Brown v.
Board of Education78 has been articulated as falling under two competing
conceptions of equal protection: anticlassification and antisubordina-
tion.79 The anticlassification principle holds that one should not classify
74. See Hersch & Shinall supra, note 44, at 56, 83.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (2016); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)
(2017); see also Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2018) (ruling that salary history
cannot be used to justify a wage difference between male and female employees). Cf.
Chamber of Com. for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., 319 F. Supp. 3d 773, 812 (E.D. Pa.
2018) (forbidding the use of such information to justify wage gaps but allowing asking the
question on free speech grounds).
76. Moshe A. Barach & John J. Horton, How Do Employers Use Compensation His-
tory?: Evidence From a Field Experiment 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6559, 2017), http://
john-joseph-horton.com/papers/WageHistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GWK-M4KA].
77. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116
(2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
78. 347 U.S. 483, 488–92 (1954).
79. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–75 (2004); Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or An-
tisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 12–14 (2003); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon,
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on the basis of protected categories, such as race and gender. The an-
tisubordination principle holds that one should not disadvantage or ag-
gravate historically oppressed groups, such as people of color and
women.80
The logistics of anticlassification and antisubordination overlap with
the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact in an-
tidiscrimination law. The conventional view is that courts predominantly
take an anticlassification position, limiting the scope of equal protection
to treating all persons with equal civility and respect, but refraining from
using equal protection as a tool to redistribute, accommodate, or object
to disparate impact.81 Reva Siegel’s historical account argues that Ameri-
can law has shifted ambivalently from one principle to the other.82
A question that arises in this context is whether privacy-based antidis-
crimination rules operate under the logic of antisubordination or anticlas-
sification. The answer is that it operates under both. One does not need a
notion of antisubordination to block a flow of information. This is an ad-
vantage because it makes this proposal viable under the current, anticlas-
sification-dominated, Equal Protection Doctrine, even outside of the
scope of statutes that recognize antisubordination, such as Title VII.83 At
the same time, because this method can operate alongside standard an-
tidiscrimination law mechanisms—and is not a competing way to address
discrimination—it is also fully compatible with the logic of
antisubordination.
The logics of anticlassification and antisubordination fall, to some ex-
tent, onto the division between disparate treatment and disparate impact
in antidiscrimination law. Disparate treatment forbids decision-makers
Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 (1987) (discussing ERA and pro-
posing that the liberal interpretation mistakenly reduced “the problem of the subordina-
tion of women to men to a problem of gender classification by law”).
80. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
108, 157 (1976); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410
(1994). Note that this analysis can also be extrapolated to other jurisdictions. For example,
equal protection in the U.S. is the functional equivalent to equal rights in Canada and the
European Union, and its principles as well can be translated into Canadian law’s recogni-
tion of direct and adverse effect discrimination, as well as the European Union’s recogni-
tion of direct and indirect discrimination.
81. See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 960–67 (2012) (noting, however, that employment discrimi-
nation statutes have an antisubordination orientation); see also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976) (declining to extend the disparate impact doctrine from Title VII
to the equal protection context, thus taking an anticlassification approach, and holding that
equal protection requires discriminatory purpose and disparate impact can be evidence of
such purpose).
82. See Siegel, supra note 79, at 1544–46. Siegel also traces a third understanding, in
between these two, under which equal protection strives not to achieve color blindness or
protection from subordinating practices, but protection from the threat of society’s balkan-
ization. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1300–03 (2011) (arguing that
courts concerned with antibalkanization focus on diversity more than on equality and that
some antisubordination-based strategies might generate further divisions in society).
83. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 241
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)).
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from making distinctions based on protected categories, such as choosing
not to hire women or black men. Disparate impact forbids decisions that
impact protected categories disproportionately, such as choosing to hire
only people above a certain height or only people who can shave.
While in other jurisdictions, such as Canada and the European Union,
both disparate treatment and disparate impact are covered by antidis-
crimination law,84 in the U.S. disparate impact has a limited scope.85 It is
applied only when it is explicitly recognized by a statute,86 such as Title
VII or the Federal Housing Act.87
A benefit of the ex-ante regulatory approach to discrimination
presented here, therefore, is that it allows disparate impact concerns to be
addressed with a disparate treatment logic, thus targeting discrimination
in areas of the law where disparate impact is not recognized. The next
Sections explore this idea further.
B. DISPARATE IMPACT-LIKE PROTECTION UNDER
DISPARATE TREATMENT
Privacy rules will be most useful in cases in which the Disparate Impact
Doctrine cannot be applied, leaving groups under-protected by tradi-
tional antidiscrimination law.88 That is, when there is no statute explicitly
incorporating disparate impact, when groups are excluded from such pro-
tection, or when probatory difficulties exist.
Few statutes prohibiting discrimination contain disparate impact provi-
sions as Title VII and the Federal Housing Act do. Many daily decisions
in life, while arguably not as crucial as employment or housing, signifi-
cantly affect our quality of life and depend on decision-makers who might
84. See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases
in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 117 (2010); Joseph
A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Cana-
dian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 98–99 (2006). These exist under the catego-
ries of direct and adverse effect discrimination (Canada) and direct and indirect
discrimination (European Union).
85. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that Title VII invali-
dates facially-neutral requirements with a disparate impact on a protected category even
without discriminatory intent unless there is a proven relationship between job require-
ments and performance).
86. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006); Richard A. Primus,
Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2004); Sa-
muel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006); Selmi, supra note 69, at 732–45.
87. See National Housing Act of 1934, H.R. 9620, Pub. L. 73–479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1749 (2006)); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015) (holding that the Fair
Housing Act includes disparate impact claims).
88. Cf. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2124–26 (stating that privacy belongs to the realm of
anticlassification and antisubordination requires providing more information). I would dis-
agree with Roberts on this point. Once we start thinking of antidiscriminatory privacy rules
in terms of proxies, we can see that whether blocking information can help situations of
disparate impact depends on whether the rule blocks only protected categories but also
their proxies. There are, however, additional limitations explored in Section D.
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unintendedly discriminate against protected categories.89 For example,
some argue that men tend to mentor more men than women—a phenom-
enon that should raise concerns especially because more men than wo-
men occupy positions of power.90 There is also evidence that doctors tend
to provide pain medication to white patients more than to black pa-
tients.91 Most notably, there is no disparate impact protection for deci-
sions on loan applications, which significantly affect people’s ability to
obtain housing.92
GINA provides an example of this. Despite the importance of genetic
discrimination, GINA explicitly prohibits disparate impact analysis.93
This generated criticism arguing that disparate impact assessments should
be incorporated to the law.94 One plausible rationale for this rule is that
blocking information to prevent discrimination, like GINA does, already
achieves efforts of antisubordination similar to disparate impact
antidiscrimination.
Privacy rules will also be useful when disparate impact statutes apply
but do not afford protection to certain minority groups. These rules are
particularly relevant, for example, in efforts to protect LGBTQ individu-
als from employment discrimination, given that courts have held that Ti-
tle VII protects discrimination based on race but not sexual orientation.95
In the same vein, privacy rules are useful for efforts to protect any other
minority that is not considered a protected category under Title VII, such
as resident legal aliens.96
Moreover, this method is useful in cases in which disparate impact is
89. See Sheppard, supra note 26 (arguing that retroactive legal remedies are ineffec-
tive at addressing institutionalized inequality and systemic discrimination).
90. See, e.g., KIM ELSESSER, SEX AND THE OFFICE: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE SEX PAR-
TITION THAT’S DIVIDING THE WORKPLACE 159–61 (2015).
91. Hoffman et al., supra note 27, at 4296; Sophie Trawalter, Kelly M. Hoffman &
Adam Waytz, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Others’ Pain, 7(11) PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012).
92. While the Supreme Court has not recognized disparate impact claims under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has
considered that disparate impact does apply to ECOA. See U.S. CONSUMER FED. PROT.
BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2012-04, LENDING DISCRIMINATION (2012).
93. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 208, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat.
881 (2008) (“[disparate impact] does not establish a cause of action under this act”).
94. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75,
100–12 (2016).
95. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) (holding that forcing the
Boy Scouts to include a homosexual man violates their First Amendment freedom to ex-
press that homosexuality is inappropriate); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that sexual identity is not covered by Title VII and em-
phasizing that Congress chose not to pass amendments to extend Title VII to cover sexual
preferences). But see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)
(extending protection because the claim included unwanted physical conduct, considered
by the court to be always of a sexual nature and therefore sex discrimination). Canada took
a different approach. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 496–97 (Can.) (ruling that,
even if Alberta’s human rights legislation omitted sexual orientation as a ground for dis-
crimination, firing a college professor for being gay violated s. 15 of the Charter and there-
fore homosexuality should be read as grounds for discrimination).
96. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89–96 (1973) (holding that Title VII
protection on national origin does not extend to alienage or citizenship).
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recognized but there are probatory difficulties.97 Discriminatory intent, in
particular, is sometimes required to establish discrimination but it is often
difficult to prove.98 By focusing on the acquisition of suspected informa-
tion rather than on its use, and by depriving decision-makers of these
information points, antidiscriminatory privacy avoids the need for prov-
ing what is in the mind of the employer.99 This is a significant advantage
since this proof is difficult to obtain as employers have incentives to hide
discriminatory intent and can do so especially when they have mixed
motives.100
C. FACIALLY NEUTRAL RULES
Antidiscriminatory privacy would be effective at dealing with facially
neutral screening rules that serve ulterior motives. As we saw above, the
key to using privacy to fight discrimination is the identification and elimi-
nation of easily observable proxies for protected categories.101 Therefore,
a facially neutral screening rule that covertly aims to discriminate can be
addressed by identifying whether the seemingly facially neutral informa-
tion used as the basis for a decision works as a proxy for a protected
category. If it does, then the discriminatory decision rule can be pre-
vented by blocking the information flow, therefore achieving the same
result as striking it down for its disparate impact, but all within a dispa-
rate treatment logic.
For example, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, the Su-
preme Court decided that it was constitutional not to hire candidates
under methadone treatment even if it created a disparate impact against
black applicants.102 The decision hinged on whether the claim was a Title
VII one—and the dissent argued that it was—as Title VII would have
recognized the decision as discriminatory due to such disparate impact,
but the Equal Protection Clause would not require so. Similarly, in
NAACP v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue,103 a fire department’s
residency requirement was questioned for having a disparate impact
against black candidates. In this case, the decision and its residency re-
quirement were considered to fall under Title VII, and the Third Circuit
held that it failed to have established business necessity.104 With very sim-
97. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2149–55.
98. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976) (holding that equal protec-
tion requires discriminatory purpose).
99. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988).
100. Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1992); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
246–47 (1989); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–100 (2003) (holding
that overt discrimination is not always required in mixed-motive cases).
101. See supra Part IV.
102. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584–94 (1979).
103. 665 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2011).
104. When disparate impact is shown, Title VII allows a defense if the employer can
demonstrate that the challenged practice is “job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.” See Lanning v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478,
489 (3d Cir. 1999) (constructing the language in Title VII to mean minimum qualifications
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ilar fact patterns, the cases reached opposite results, although there might
be policy reasons to treat them the same.
An antidiscriminatory privacy rule blocking the information point
about a candidate’s use of methadone or a candidate’s residency in the
area would have avoided the efforts necessary to frame the case under
Title VII, which were successful in the former case and unsuccessful in
the latter. In such a way, this method allows us to address facially neutral
forms of discrimination against minorities not protected by Title VII and
discriminatory decisions outside of an employment relationship (there-
fore not covered by its disparate impact branch). When State action is
involved, these are also currently unprotected by the Equal Protection
Clause when interpreted under a disparate treatment logic.105
This feature becomes especially relevant in overcoming the distinction
between mutable and immutable traits. In our current legal context,
courts starkly distinguish between personal traits based on whether they
are mutable or immutable.106 This, according to Kenji Yoshino, traces to
an artificial distinction between being a member of a protected category
and behaving like one.107 Courts protect individuals from distinctions
based on immutable traits such as skin color and chromosomes, but rarely
from those based on the behaviors typically associated with those
groups.108 According to Yoshino, the underlying logic of this separation is
that minority members can suppress their behavior to blend into the
mainstream, so less protection is warranted for them.109
In such context, more subtle kinds of discrimination exist towards
groups that do not assimilate—either because they refuse to or because
they cannot.110 Assimilation is the way to avoid this subtler form of dis-
that are necessary to perform the job successfully); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (setting a high standard for job relatedness, arguing that
to show job relatedness for business necessity in a standardized test the employer must
show empirical evidence on correlation between test scores and job performance); Eliza-
beth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 978
(1982) (arguing that courts have been strict on low-level employment regarding business
necessity requirements and lenient with high-level employment for the same
requirements).
105. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.”). Moreover, “Official action will not be held unconstitutional
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.” Id. at 264–65.
106. See, e.g., Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 195 (Can.) (illustrat-
ing the logic of immutable traits by ruling that, when a ground is not covered by provincial
legislation, it should be read in through s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms if it is “not within the control of the individual and, in this sense, immutable,” mean-
ing that it qualifies as “a characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious action”).
107. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772, 774–75 (2002).
108. Id. at 876–77. Also note that courts use different types of protections for individu-
als that have different immutable characteristics. Strict scrutiny is applied to race, but inter-
mediate scrutiny is applied to gender, while disability and sexual orientation are not
considered protected categories.
109. Id.; KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 22–23, 172 (2006).
110. Yoshino, supra note 107, at 839, 913 (referring to “queers,” by essence those who
refuse to cover and pregnant women, by nature who cannot cover). YOSHINO, supra note
109, at 19 (“As the gay rights movement gained strength, the demand to convert gradually
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crimination and, at the same time, it is precisely its effect.111 “[A]fter all,
the logic goes, if a bigot cannot discriminate between two individuals, he
cannot discriminate against one of them.”112
Privacy rules are an unexpected way out of the dilemma. What Yoshino
could have said is that if a bigot cannot distinguish between two individu-
als, he cannot discriminate against one of them. When applied to con-
crete, potentially discriminatory decisions, privacy rules can provide
coverage without forcing people to cover; they provide assimilation with-
out requiring people to actually assimilate. This also serves long-term
goals of reducing biases by furthering the inclusion of minority members:
if more minority members are hired, decision-makers will progressively
see the idea of hiring members of such class as less unusual.113
D. LIMITATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
While being operable under an anticlassification paradigm is an advan-
tage for privacy-based antidiscrimination rules in the sense that it makes
them compatible with the mainstream of antidiscrimination doctrine and
case law, this compatibility also implies their most important limitation.
While antidiscriminatory privacy rules work well to avoid disparate treat-
ment, their effectiveness is limited when dealing with some aspects of dis-
parate impact. In particular, antidiscriminatory privacy rules are not
useful to address cases in which affirmative action is considered
desirable.114
This is because the method can fix a decision-making process that in-
volves discrimination, but cannot fix a selection set that is in itself une-
qual. In other words, as it can be seen by comparing both case studies,
since the method only addresses the decision-making process, it is un-
likely to solve significant structural inequalities.
The problem of inadequacy in the decision-making process and the
problem of a candidate pool with embedded inequality are different, and
blocking information from the decision-maker can only address the for-
mer. The main limitation is when inequality is substantive (socio-eco-
nomic conditions, generations of unequal educational opportunities) so
ceded to the demand to pass. This shift can be seen in the military’s adoption in 1993 of the
‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy, under which gays are permitted to serve so long as we agree
to pass. Finally, at millennium’s turn, the demand to pass is giving way to the demand to
cover—gays are increasingly permitted to be gay and out so long as we do not ‘flaunt’ our
identities.”).
111. Yoshino, supra note 107, at 877 (“Put differently, the descriptive claim that the
group can assimilate because of the mutability or invisibility of its defining trait transmutes
into the prescriptive claim that the group should assimilate with very little intervening in-
vestigation by a court.”).
112. Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.ny-
times.com/2006/01/15/magazine/the-pressure-to-cover.html [https://perma.cc/AP23-C9VF].
113. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (arguing that the inclu-
sion of different races in an educational program helps break down stereotypes).
114. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2124 (“Specifically, to assess whether a policy dispropor-
tionately impacts a particular group, or to allow affirmative action, the covered entity must
have some knowledge of the relevant information.”).
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that neutral decision parameters still lead to discriminatory outcomes. If a
decision-maker must select from a pool of candidates with very few mi-
nority candidates, the chosen candidates are less likely to be minority
members even if the decision-maker is impartial. Addressing embedded
inequalities requires different methods, such as affirmative action. But
affirmative action cannot be implemented if the decision-maker does not
have access to the relevant data point.
When there are embedded inequalities, and decision-makers might also
be biased against protected categories, the question of whether blocking
information will be useful for minority members or an affirmative action
program (which requires allowing for the information) will be better for
them is a question of how much substantive inequality they face. For ex-
ample, to choose a Supreme Court justice, will ignoring gender or consid-
ering gender lead to equal opportunities for women? If we ignore gender
and use only information such as employment history, this might lead to
unequal outcomes depending on whether positions such as circuit judge
or appellate judge were inaccessible to women, for example due to im-
plicit sexism or loss of opportunity due to prior choices to take maternity
leaves. Mechanisms that build on antisubordination principles (such as
affirmative action) would provide a more robust protection in this situa-
tion. In the orchestra auditions example, blocking gender worked because
women had similar access to a variety of musical instruments and similar
access to elite music schools. But if women had historically been confined
to playing the piano and being educated through private lessons at home,
having auditions behind a curtain would not have resolved such substan-
tive inequality problem.
There are some alternatives for making this method compatible with
affirmative action and other tools that address diversity concerns under
an antisubordination logic. One possibility would be to condition the in-
formation flow instead of banning it directly. When dealing with explicitly
diversity-concerned decision-makers, information could be released
under the condition of a specific use: if active diversity measures are to be
established. For example, if regulation requires companies to have a gen-
der quota for the board of directors, but not one for interns, and if gender
discrimination was suspected for lower hierarches as well, regulation
could also require the company to receive gender-blind resumes.115 Then,
if one of these companies wanted to go further in their diversity efforts
and establish an affirmative action program for women in the workplace
for which they would need information on gender, regulation could allow
that company to access applicants’ gender information conditionally on
115. Note that, historically, quotas were not considered affirmative action. Information
on race or gender can be included to increase diversity as a soft variable in a holistic analy-
sis. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 589–593 (2009); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S.
297, 304 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).
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the existence of such program.116
Another possibility would be choice bracketing. A system could be de-
signed to block information at stages where decision-bias could be more
prevalent and allow information at stages where antisubordination princi-
ples are likely to play a larger role. For example, gender could be blocked
at a first resume submission stage, and then considered when choosing
the candidates that would move from the first to the second round of
interviews.
VI. BUILDING A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PREJUDICE-BASED
AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
Broadly speaking, economists distinguish two reasons why a decision-
maker might engage in discrimination. The first occurs when the decision-
maker has a bias or animus against a particular group of people.117 I will
call this “prejudice-based discrimination.”118 The second occurs when the
decision-maker uses someone’s gender, race, sexual orientation, or any
other characteristic to make a statistical inference. Although it does not
assume animus or bias against the protected category, it still involves the
unequal treatment of equals.119 This is commonly referred to as statistical
discrimination.120
The standard economic narrative is that a large amount, if not most, of
discrimination is of the statistical type.121 This idea is sometimes found in
legal scholarship as well.122 It is an established idea in economics that,
when a decision-maker (in our prior example, Abby) wants to learn infor-
mation about another individual (Ben) and such information is impossi-
ble or costly to acquire, the decision-maker will rely on statistical
116. Of course, some degree of monitoring would be needed to ensure that the program
was legitimate and not a covert way to find the information to install a discriminatory
practice.
117. See BECKER, supra note 8, at 8–9; Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Won’t Stop Dis-
crimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22, 22 (1991).
118. This is commonly referred to as taste-based discrimination in the economics litera-
ture. See Jonathan Guryan & Kerwin Kofi Charles, Taste-Based or Statistical Discrimina-
tion: The Economics of Discrimination Returns to Its Roots, 123 ECON. J. 417 (2013)
(tracing the evolution of empirical work in economics concerning discrimination).
119. See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659, 659–61 (1972); Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINA-
TION IN LABOR MARKETS 3–4 (Albert Rees & Orley Ashenfelter eds., 1973).
120. Hanming Fang & Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirm-
ative Action: A Survey, in SOCIAL ECONOMICS 140–42 (Jess Benhabib, Matthew Jackson &
Alberto Bisin eds., 2011).
121. See Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
228, 228–29 (1986); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622 (1991); Holzer,
Raphael, & Stoll, supra note 13, at 452.
122. Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 908
(2005).
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generalizations of the groups to which that individual belongs.123
In Edmund Phelps’ seminal statistical discrimination model,124 an em-
ployer cannot observe workers’ level of skill, q, drawn from a normal skill
distribution,125 but it can observe their group identity and a noisy produc-
tivity signal.126 We can define such identity in any way, such as P for
purple hair and G for green hair.127 Under the model, the question of
statistical discrimination is the question of why two workers with the
same productivity signal, but from different groups, are treated
differently.128
This can take place under two scenarios: stereotyping and differential
observability. Stereotyping takes place when the groups’ signals are
equally informative of individuals’ productivity but the employer believes
that one group, P, has lower average human capital investments leading
to lower average skill. It does not matter whether the identity is probative
of skill level, but only whether the employer believes so.129 In that case,
employers will consider employees from P to have a lower expected pro-
ductivity even when they have the same signal as G. Therefore, P workers
will receive a lower salary under the same signal.
Differential observability takes place when the skill distributions are
identical but the signals for P workers’ skills are less informative than
those of G workers. Because this will mean that the expected productivity
of a P worker with any signal will be closer to that of the population
average, this will lead highly qualified P workers to receive a lower salary
than their G equivalents, and low qualified P workers to receive a higher
salary than their G equivalents.130
Twenty years ago, we began to see empirical evidence of this process.
In a field experiment involving fictitious automobile buyers, Ian Ayres
and Peter Siegelman showed that car dealers quoted significantly lower
prices to white men than to female and black buyers.131 Under Phelps’
123. See Phelps, supra note 119, at 659; Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical
Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 IND. LABOR RELAT. REV. 175, 176–77
(1977); see also Cofone & Robertson, supra note 33, at 1049–50 (explaining the relation-
ship between privacy and statistical generalizations).
124. Phelps, supra note 119, at 659.
125. N(mj,sj2)
126. q, where q = q + e, q being skill and e being a normally distributed zero-mean
error.
127. j ∈ {P,G}
128. See Shelly Lundberg & Richard Startz, On the Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16
J. LABOR ECON. 292, 293, 306 (1998) (introducing a model showing that statistical discrimi-
nation in competitive markets and without differences in average human capital introduces
inefficiencies in the system. Basically, due to statistical discrimination minorities face lower
incentives to invest in human capital, community social capital is lowered, and they de-
velop lower levels of productivity.).
129. See infra Appendix.
130. Fang & Moro, supra note 120, at 137–40.
131. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a
New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 304 (1995) (clarifying that the empirical evidence could
be motivated by both theories of discrimination); see also Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A
Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 991–92 (1994)
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model, the car dealers probably made an inference of the first type and
assumed that white men are more informed about the value of cars or are
better equipped to negotiate bad offers than other groups. In a ground-
breaking field experiment ten years later focusing on race, Marianne Ber-
trand and Sendhil Mullainathan showed that resumes with white-
sounding names have a fifty percent greater chance of receiving a
callback than identical resumes with black-sounding names.132 This would
be, once again, the first type of statistical discrimination under Phelps’
model. As resumes are equally informative on average, employers
seemed to have thought that black applicants were on average less
qualified.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act bans the use of these types of statisti-
cal generalizations to exclude some historically disadvantaged groups
along a set of dimensions, such as race and gender. This is also the case
when the generalization is true.133
B. A BIAS-DRIVEN AND RATIONAL-CHOICE
DISCRIMINATION DISTINCTION
The information dynamic identified above leads to the conclusion that,
even though prejudice-based discrimination and statistical discrimination
are often considered to work very differently,134 and in many contexts
they do, for the purposes of privacy rules they operate under the same
information dynamic.
There are relevant legal implications to determining whether a discrim-
inatory decision was made under a prejudice-based classification pattern
or a statistical inference that has a disparate impact.135 However, both
types of discrimination have the same information dynamic. While a dis-
tinction between prejudice-based and statistical discrimination can be
useful to determine whether one should apply disparate treatment or dis-
parate impact doctrine,136 it does not determine (ex ante) which informa-
(using data on bail amounts to show race discrimination in bail setting in New Haven, by
showing lower bond rates (bond fee divided by bail amount) for minority defendants).
132. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 64, at 992 (showing that, for employers in
Boston and Chicago, resumes with white-sounding names have fifty percent more chances
of receiving a callback).
133. See City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978).
134. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 373–75 (arguing as a pragmatic concern that
disclosing previously private information will help antidiscriminatory efforts only as long as
statistical discriminators significantly outnumber prejudice-based discriminators).
135. Disparate treatment applies to both prejudice-based and statistical discrimination,
as long as the groups are treated differently. One could have a classification pattern based
on statistical discrimination. For example: “I will not hire people with purple hair because
they have lower average human capital than people with green hair.” However, the deci-
sion-maker in that example is concerned with human capital, not hair color. So, if hair
color as a proxy for human capital in that decision is not made explicit (i.e., “I will hire
people that I perceive to have high human capital”) it will be treated as a disparate impact
problem, not a classification one.
136. See supra Sections V.A and V.B.
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tion flow should be blocked. The same privacy-based preventive solution
should be applied to both.
This leads to the possibility of making a similar distinction instead: one
between bias-driven discrimination and rational-choice discrimination—
both of which can work under disparate treatment or disparate impact
doctrine.137 Rational-choice discrimination would concern “correct” sta-
tistical inferences, while bias-based discrimination would concern choices
made based on animus, prejudice, or otherwise incorrect inferences.138
From the two scenarios described for statistical discrimination, the first
(belief of lower average human capital) would be bias-driven, while the
second (different informativeness of signals) would be rational-choice
driven.
Initially, one would think that this distinction is also unimportant in
discrimination-preventive privacy rules. In the Ban the Box example, for
instance, whether employers were correct in believing that black men are
more likely to have a criminal record (making it rational-choice discrimi-
nation) or they were mistaken (making it bias-driven discrimination) is
irrelevant for the purposes of eliminating the information that enables a
discriminatory act. However, to prevent discrimination by blocking infor-
mation flows one must understand decision-makers’ perceptions139 Peo-
ple do not always update their prior beliefs when they obtain new
information.140 The way that a decision-maker processes information will
be different if she does so through an irrational heuristic or one that is
only an information cost saving mechanism.
Moreover, privacy rules affect bias-driven discrimination with an added
wrinkle that does not exist in the way they affect rational-choice discrimi-
nation. For bias-driven discrimination, privacy rules can often effectively
shelter the disadvantaged groups that they attempt to protect. However,
this comes at the cost of not reducing those biases against them, which
generate the need for protective rules in the first place. That is, privacy
rules can prevent discrimination due to bias, but cannot fix the bias itself.
137. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1169–71 (1995) (arguing that discriminatory employment decisions often derive not from
discriminatory intent but from judgment errors that are unintentional, and suggesting to
follow a cognitive process approach to discrimination instead).
138. See Bordalo et al., supra note 58, at 1753–54 (“We present a model of stereotypes
based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representativeness heuristic. A decision-maker assesses
a target group by overweighting its representative types, defined as the types that occur
more frequently in that group than in a baseline reference group.”); see also David Arnold,
Will Dobbie, & Crystal Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 QUARTERLY J. ECON.
1885, 1886–89 (2018) (using a similar distinction that separates correct and incorrect infer-
ences of risk consistent with the theory of stereotyping).
139. See supra Section VI.B; see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 982 (2006) (describing the role of biases in decision-
making); Roberts, supra note 28, at 2170–72.
140. See supra Section VI.C; see also Eberhardt et al., supra note 55, at 876–92; Nosek
et al., supra note 55, at 50–52.
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This produces a similar tradeoff to that of “covering,” where minori-
ties’ civil rights face the tension of their short-term interest to blend in
and their long-term interests to promote identity politics.141 The effec-
tiveness of a privacy rule that blocks information will depend on the tim-
ing of the protection. For a minority with the ability to cover, such as the
LGBTQ community or religious minorities,142 an effective privacy rule
that hides their status and protects them from a discriminatory decision
(being hired, or having a cake baked for their wedding) will be easier to
implement than for a protected group without such ability, such as racial
minorities or women.
However, a rule that blocks information in a long-term relationship will
be more difficult for the individual and potentially more detrimental to
the long-term interests of the group. The rule would be difficult and dam-
aging for the individual because she would have to exert a constant effort
to cover. It would be detrimental to the long-term interests of the group
because members of society would not get used to seeing members of
that group integrate—it reduces those biases that generate the need to
cover in the hope that one day that need will disappear.143 In the LGBTQ
example, this was sometimes referred to as the normalizing effect of com-
ing out as a group.
This dynamic illustrates that privacy rules will be useful to address dis-
crimination for one-time decisions, rather than ongoing relationships. It
also illustrates that these information rules will work to combat uncon-
scious biases differently than do traditional antidiscrimination rules.
In sum, a traditional distinction in economics separates prejudice-based
and statistical discrimination, where the first is driven by an intent to dis-
criminate against the protected class and the second is not.144 I propose
that, while prejudice-based and statistical discrimination work differently
in many ways, they have the same underlying information dynamic.
Moreover, I propose that there is another relevant distinction between
bias-driven and rational-choice discrimination. When bias-driven discrim-
ination is involved, those who design and implement antidiscriminatory
141. See Yoshino, supra note 107, at 837–38; see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 42, 48 (1991) (introducing
the dilemma of difference, under which people must choose whether to hide their differ-
ences with a ruling majority to blend in or emphasize their differences in order to be com-
pensated for the adverse consequences of such differences, but then also exacerbate those
adverse consequences by making the difference more evident); Adam Cureton, Hiding a
Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled, in DISABILITY IN PRACTICE: ATTITUDES, POLI-
CIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS 15 (Adam Cureton & Thomas Hill Jr. eds., 2018) (discussing
when people with non-visible disabilities choose to pass as non-disabled or identify them-
selves as having a disability).
142. See Yoshino supra note 107, at 774–80 (explaining how different minorities cover
differently).
143. This of course assumes that, given the option, at least some minority members
would choose to integrate, were they free to do so.
144. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 365 (“Statistical discrimination is based, not
on irrational animus, but on the use of heuristics by decisionmakers who believe—correctly
or not—that observable hallmarks of membership in a group correlate with some undesir-
able characteristic.”).
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privacy rules should be aware of the potential long-term detrimental ef-
fects of these rules, usually but not always offset by their short-term
gains. There is a tradeoff between assimilation and avoiding the need for
assimilation.145 For rational-choice discrimination, this potential long-
term problem is not present.
C. IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING HARM
The empirical studies on discrimination mentioned above146 raised crit-
ical questions about the effectiveness of Title VII in preventing discrimi-
nation in the workplace.147 Antidiscrimination law, some argue, is
ineffective at dealing with unconscious biases—discrimination remains
nonetheless.148
Independently of where one stands in this assessment, the claim that
antidiscrimination law has limited effectiveness in dealing with uncon-
scious bias leads to the question of what alternative and complementary
methods exist to combat discrimination. By focusing on reproachable
conduct in the use of information, antidiscrimination law necessarily has
an ex post orientation. Thus, it can prevent discrimination only insofar as
decision-makers factor in the expected costs of sanctions ex ante and
avoid the undesirable conduct in order to avoid those sanctions—in the
same way that tort law prevents accidents. However, relying on people to
avoid a conduct because they anticipate sanctions is less effective when
the reproachable conduct is deciding based on biases that are uncon-
scious. In some situations, people might not know that they are engaging
in a discriminatory conduct, or might tell themselves that they are not
doing so. This inefficacy highlights the importance, particularly for an-
tidiscrimination, of a complementary ex ante approach that focuses on
prevention like the one this paper discusses.
Having a precautionary approach to antidiscrimination that comple-
ments traditional antidiscriminatory efforts presents two central advan-
tages. First, its ability to deal with unconscious biases. Second, its ability
to address not only classification but also subordination problems without
generating a worry of breaking social cohesion—insofar as the subordina-
tion problem is in the decision-making process and not in the embedded
inequality of the selection pool.149
145. Cultural assimilation can be described as the process according to which a minority
group, or some of its members, starts converging in cultural resemblance towards the
majoritarian group that is dominant in their society.
146. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 131, at 305; Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 131,
at 993–94; Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 64, at 991–93.
147. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2005).
148. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1017 (2004).
149. See Siegel, supra note 79, at 1300–03 (introducing the antibalkanization perspec-
tive as one in which courts are concerned with social cohesion and worry that some an-
tisubordination-based strategies might generate further divisions in society).
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Because antidiscrimination law focuses on sanctioning reproachable
conduct in the use of information about protected categories, it can only
operate ex post facto, after a discriminatory act has taken place. There-
fore, it can prevent discrimination only to the extent that decision-makers
factor the expected costs of sanctions. This incentive-setting is less effec-
tive when the reproachable conduct is based on unconscious biases.
Because discrimination driven by unconscious biases can be rooted in a
decision-maker’s “common sense” through heuristics built on generaliza-
tions that could even have some statistical value, the decision-maker
might not always know that she is employing them. Then, sanctioning the
behavior ex post will have little effect in her ex ante incentives. Regulating
information in this scenario is particularly important as a preventive an-
tidiscriminatory effort.
Finally, given the ex-ante nature of privacy-based antidiscrimination
rules, they also avoid ex post harm better than traditional antidiscrimina-
tion efforts.150 First, they avoid the harm of discriminatory acts that, even
if addressed ex post facto by antidiscrimination law, are difficult to fully
compensate.151 Second, because they do not rely on deterrence, they can
prevent discrimination produced by unconscious biases. Third, due to
their preventive nature, they avoid the worries of antibalkanization to
which disparate impact measures are sometimes subjected.152
VII. CONCLUSION
There are different ways to fight discrimination alongside claims under
legislative frameworks that are operative ex post, such as Title VII claims.
There is, for example, affirmative action in education and quotas for
board membership. By exploring information flows that are common in
privacy norms and antidiscrimination norms, I develop another way to
fight discrimination: by using privacy rules.
Privacy rules can offer short-term protection from discrimination by
blocking information that the law deems harmful in a decision-making
process. When decision-makers’ samples are skewed, when they have
processing errors such as behavioral biases, or when discrimination is in-
tentional, blocking information might be more effective at preventing dis-
crimination than allowing it. In this way, privacy rules can aid
antidiscriminatory efforts.
The crucial task for preventing discrimination through privacy rules is
identifying and blocking data points that are believed to be proxies for
categories that the law wants to protect. That is, for antidiscriminatory
150. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2102 (“Antidiscrimination law prohibits discrimina-
tory actions by outlawing certain types of conduct, but privacy law renders the offensive
conduct practically impossible by impeding access to the information necessary for the
unfavorable differentiation.”); Austin, supra note 29.
151. See id. at 2155–56.
152. See Siegel, supra note 79, at 1299, 1302-03 (arguing that courts concerned with
antibalkanization focus on diversity more than on equality and that some antisubordina-
tion-based strategies might generate further divisions in society).
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privacy rules to be effective, they must block information that can be
used as proxies that shift discrimination to groups other than those pro-
tected by the regulation. They must also identify proxies that reduce or
expand the group of people that are discriminated against and gauge
those proxies’ usefulness in helping protected categories.
This preventive method is useful to expand protection from discrimina-
tion. First, it widens the scope of antidiscrimination protection for those
cases in which disparate impact is not recognized. Second, it is useful in
those cases where disparate impact is recognized but there are probatory
difficulties: (a) intent is required to establish discrimination but it is diffi-
cult to prove it, or (b) disparate impact is admitted as an evidentiary stan-
dard but it is also difficult to prove (such as housing). Third, this
preventive method can attend to worries about antibalkanization.
At a policy level, by virtue of operating ex ante, it avoids the social
harms created by discriminatory conduct—a problem that ex post com-
pensation only partially solves. Moreover, it can address unconscious bi-
ases better than ex post antidiscriminatory efforts.
In sum, the framework introduced here helps to determine the effec-
tiveness of antidiscrimination measures based on information restrictions,
and it explains how to design privacy rules that prevent discrimination
effectively.
174 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
VIII. APPENDIX: IDENTIFYING PROXIES THROUGH
CROSS ELASTICITY
I mentioned before that the objective relationship between information
points X and Y does not determine the extent to which someone is likely
to use X instead of Y to judge someone else.153 Their relationship in that
person’s mind determines it, and her perception might or might not trace
an objective relationship. Therefore, the question of whether a data point
qualifies as a proxy for another data point for our purposes is a question
of cross elasticity.
Cross elasticity evaluates the relationship between two goods as inde-
pendent, complementary, or substitute depending on how the purchased
quantity of one of them changes upon a price change in the other. For
example, imagine Abby and Ben have a daily budget to buy a combina-
tion of apples and bananas. Upon an increase in the price of bananas,
Abby moves to buy only apples, and Ben continues to buy the same pro-
portion of both in smaller quantities. While Abby sees these fruits as sub-
stitutes, Ben views them as independent goods.
Let A be Abby, B be a company called Boss Inc., X the unavailable
information that Boss would like, and Y the information that Boss could
use instead. Let cX be the cost for Boss of acquiring information X about
Abby, and cY the cost for it to acquire information Y about her. Let q be
quantity. Let c1 and q1 refer to the cost and quantity of information at
time 1, and c2 and q2 refer to the cost and quantity at time 2. When the
cost of acquiring X increases, the proxy relationship between information
X and information Y is given by the change in the quantity of Y that Boss
attempts to acquire divided by the change in cost of the now costlier piece
of information X.154
If the elasticity between the data points is negative, this denotes that X
and Y are complementary pieces of information, while if it is positive, it
denotes that they are substitutes.155 A piece of information is a proxy for
another for Boss if it treats them as substitutes.
An example might clarify this. Imagine Abby applies for jobs with four
companies, called Boss, Chief, Director, and Employer. Imagine these
companies only care about productivity, and they want to know whether
Abby is likely to ask for a maternity leave during the duration of the
employment (X). Imagine state laws protect Abby from having them ask
her this directly.
153. See supra Section IV.B.
154. As with any other measure of elasticity, elasticity cannot be measured when there
is no change in cost.
155. Formally, E ∈(−1,1)
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Before the law’s implementation, the companies could just ask Abby
this directly, which would take them about two minutes, assuming one
minute for their question and one minute for her answer. Assume each
minute to cost them one imaginary utility point. After the law is imple-
mented, they need to ask five indirect questions instead of one to get that
same information, taking them five times as long during their brief inter-
view and, therefore, taking them ten minutes instead. So, state law in-
creased their cost of information acquisition X by 500%.156 They can now
choose between incurring this increased cost and spending the amount of
time for one question (the original cost of two minutes) by asking a dif-
ferent question: whether Abby is engaged or recently married (Y). Imag-
ine Boss still asks Abby about her potential maternity leave through five
indirect questions, and that Chief, Director, and Employer only inquire
about marital status instead.
The price of X changed from two to ten, and the quantity of X de-
manded changed from four to one. Therefore, the cross elasticity of X
and Y is
In this example, the companies treated marital status (on average) very
much as a proxy for the applicant’s likelihood of eventually asking for a
maternity leave. An elasticity of one would have meant that they treated
them as perfect substitutes, and an elasticity of zero would have meant
that they treated them as completely independent. Given the elasticity of
0.9, if state law really wants to protect Abby, it should prohibit companies
from asking her about her marital status as well.
Alternatively, imagine that Boss hires a human resources company to
interview job candidates. The company offers two services: since it is for-
bidden to ask the candidates whether they want to have children, a basic
service asks them whether they recently married, while a more complete
service estimates their likelihood of having a child directly through an
algorithm with a series of estimators with almost complete accuracy. How
much is Boss willing to pay for the second service compared to the first?
If it is not willing to pay much for the difference, we can infer that it
considers the data points to be substitutes.
156. The cost of X will be determined by its Shannon entropy H(p), where p is the
probability distribution of X and H(p) ∈ (0,1). A variable’s entropy is a measure of its
uncertainty. That is, of how much information, on average, one needs to know its value. X
has a higher entropy than Y when we need more yes/no questions to know its value. See
THOMAS M. COVER & JOY A. THOMAS, ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION THEORY 12–15
(2012); see generally Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL
SYST. TECH. J. 379, 10–12 (1948). Since, for these purposes, we care about elasticity, the
relative entropy of X and Y, which is the distance between their probability distributions, is
relevant as it will determine cost differences. The relative entropy of X and Y, D = (p ⏐⏐ z),
will describe the inefficiency of describing X (with a probability mass function p) through Y (with a probability
mass function z). See COVER & THOMAS, supra, at 18–21.
176 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
The relationship between these data points can be identified in a simi-
lar way when the law makes X not more difficult but impossible to ac-
quire. In this situation, costs and prices are absent. After the state law is
enacted, Boss, Chief, Director, and Employer are unable to incur a higher
cost to acquire X as Boss did in the previous example by asking Abby
about a potential maternity leave through a larger set of questions. In this
new scenario, imagine that, when questions about future pregnancy were
allowed, 75% of employers did so (Boss, Chief, and Director), and 25%
did not (Employer). When the law forbids it, 50% ask about marital sta-
tus (Boss and Chief), and 50% do not (Director and Employer). The de-
gree of substitution of the data points is given by:
In the example,
As it can be seen, determining whether a data point is a proxy for another
in terms of antidiscrimination is an empirical question; it is not one of
objective correlation, but one of subjective perception, measurable
through cross elasticity. A sound empirical strategy to interrogate
whether a concrete data point functions as a proxy, therefore, would not
use quantitative analysis to measure predictiveness but a field experiment
or survey to measure perceptions, and evaluate cross elasticities based on
those.
Of course, we are not always going to be able to test the cross elasticity
of information. But even when we cannot, this framework is useful be-
cause it points to what questions we should ask.
We should not worry about objective correlations, but about decision-
maker’s subjective perceptions of them; therefore, it is valuable to have
empirical research that explores these perceptions. Moreover, on occa-
sions we might be able to build heuristic approaches. Even if we ignore
the degree to which a decision-maker sees two information points as re-
placeable, we might know from anecdotal evidence whether the average
decision-maker in the field views them as completely replaceable, fairly
replaceable, or not replaceable at all.
